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Abstract
We propose an investment-momentum strategy of buying past winners with
low investment and selling past losers with high investment, which simulta-
neously exploits two dimensions of market inefficiencies. The new strategy
generates twice the monthly returns earned by either the price momentum or
investment strategy (1.44% vs. 0.75% or 0.61%). Despite the diminishing anom-
alies in recent decades, the investment-momentum stays persistent. The
mispricing-based strategy performs better in periods of high investor sentiment
or for stocks with high limits-to-arbitrage, which is consistent with our expec-
tations. Overall, we show that one can simultaneously use multiple dimensions
of market inefficiency to attain superior performance.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Price momentum is pervasive and has been observed
across periods (Chan, Jegadeesh, & Lakonishok, 1996;
Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993, 2001), countries (Griffin, Ji, &
Martin, 2004; Rouwenhorst, 1998), and markets (Asness,
Moskowitz, & Pedersen, 2013; Menkhoff, Sarno,
Schmeling, & Schrimpf, 2012). In light of its remarkable
success, it is logical to question: Should ‘momentum
traders’ care about any corporate fundamentals, like
investments? Given their trading strategy solely based on
past stock returns and ‘arbitrage away any under-reaction
left behind by the newswatchers’ (Hong & Stein, 1999,
p. 2145), it seems unnecessary for them to consider any-
thing other than past prices.1
With respect to this question, Baker, Stein, and
Wurgler (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009) show that
stock market mispricing influences firms' investment and
‘firms that overinvest are overpriced’ (Polk &
Sapienza, 2009, p. 188), implying that a firm's level of
investment serves as a (partial) indication of its (mis)valua-
tion.2 If themispricing indicated by investment is fully cap-
tured by the price momentum, then the investment should
have no added value to momentum traders. If this is not
the case, then it is likely to add incremental value to
momentum traders and, hence, an opportunity for them
to arbitrage away, over and above, any underreaction left
behind by the newswatchers.3
In this paper, we develop a two-dimensional behav-
ioural strategy by combining price momentum and capital
investment4 to explore the multiple dimensions of market
inefficiency simultaneously. Our investment-momentum
(InvMom) strategy also seems to be supported by the evi-
dence from Hou et al. (2020) who classify 452 documented
anomalies into six broad categories (i.e., momentum,
value-versus-growth, investment, profitability, intangibles,
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and trading frictions) and show that the two strongest
anomalies are the investment and momentum anomalies.
Thus, combining investment and momentum is likely to
generate superior performance by taking advantage of the
two most prominent dimensions of market inefficiency/
mispricing, if the two strategies carry an incremental or
independent information set.
Overall, our InvMom strategy of buying past winners
with low investment and selling past losers with high
investment generates about twice the monthly returns
earned by either the momentum or investment strategy
alone (1.44% vs. 0.75% or 0.61%, respectively) between
1965 and 2015. Further, when the momentum or invest-
ment strategy exhibits insignificant performance during
the later stage of the sample (2000–2015),5 the investment
momentum produces persistent results. Hence, the invest-
ment momentum is stronger and more persistent than the
momentum or investment strategy alone (Figure 1).
Recognising that mispriced stocks influence firms'
investment decisions through equity financing and catering
channels (Baker et al., 2003; Polk & Sapienza, 2009), we
conjecture that the incremental value of corporate invest-
ment for a momentum trader should be higher when the
conditions are more favourable for the two channels to
function.6 Baker et al. (2003) show that firms' investment
decisions are affected by stock mispricing via the equity
financing channel. They interpret that managers prefer
issuing overvalued stocks to fund investments and are less
likely to fund investments if they have to issue under-
valued stocks. Polk and Sapienza (2009) present an alter-
native explanation of the positive relationship between
firms' investment and stock mispricing, that is, the
catering channel. They argue that managers cater to inves-
tors by accepting some negative investment opportunities
when stocks are overvalued.7 Both channels suggest that
firms are more likely to overinvest when their stocks are
overpriced, through issuing overpriced shares or catering
to the current market sentiment. Hence, the level of corpo-
rate investment serves as a good indicator of the degree of
mispricing and, therefore, lends more incremental infor-
mation to the momentum traders.
Following the identification strategies of Baker
et al. (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009), we show that
the investment momentum generates the strongest
results when conditions are most favourable for the
equity financing and catering channels to work. This con-
firms our conjecture and, to some extent, helps us under-
stand why and how the investment momentum generates
enhanced performance.
Further, our mispricing-based InvMom strategy should
work better, or the investment-momentum anomaly
should be more pronounced when the investor sentiment
is high or limits to arbitrage are severe (Baker &
Wurgler, 2007; Jacobs, 2015). We use the Baker and
Wurgler (2006) sentiment index and the University of
Michigan consumer sentiment index to gauge investor
sentiment, bid-ask spread, institutional ownership, and
idiosyncratic volatility to measure the degree of the limits
to arbitrage. We find that the investment momentum is
more pronounced in periods of high investor sentiment or
for stocks subject to high limits to arbitrage, which further
confirms our multi-dimensional mispricing approach.
We conduct a series of robustness checks to test our
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FIGURE 1 Investment-Momentum Strategy, 1965–2015. This figure shows the cumulative wealth of investing $1 in 1965 and holding it
until 2015 by following five different strategies: (1) investing in the risk-free asset; (2) investing in the CRSP value-weighted index; (3) the
momentum strategy of buying past winners and shorting past losers; (4) the investment strategy of buying low investment stocks and
shorting high investment stocks; and (5) the investment-momentum strategy (InvMom) of buying winner stocks with low investment and
shorting loser stocks with high investment. The numbers reported in the figure are dollars
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InvMom strategy, compared to either the momentum or
investment strategy, is not driven by the size effect. We
further show that our finding is not subject to how we
construct our portfolios and how we measure their per-
formance. Apart from using raw returns, we further
employed characteristic-adjusted returns and standard
asset pricing models, such as the Fama–French three-
and five-factor models to adjust for risk.8 Our results are
consistent throughout the tests.
Our paper relates to a string of studies in the momen-
tum literature, which explore the incremental value of cor-
porate fundamentals in the traditional price-momentum
strategy. Prior studies have identified some firm fundamen-
tals/characteristics that strengthen the price momentum,
such as firm size and analyst coverage (Brennan,
Jegadeesh, & Swaminathan, 1993; Chen & Zhao, 2012;
Hong, Lim, & Stein, 2002; Zhang, 2006), earnings (Chan
et al., 1996; Chordia & Shivakumar, 2006), book-to-market
ratio (Asness et al., 2013; Daniel & Titman, 1999), turnover
(Lee & Swaminathan, 2000), idiosyncratic return volatility
(Chichernea & Slezak, 2013; Zhang, 2006), revenues, costs,
and real options (Sagi & Seasholes, 2007), dividend pay-
ments (Asem, 2009), and, recently, seven major fundamen-
tals to take advantage of big data (Huang, Zhang, Zhou, &
Zhu, 2019).
The objective of our study is not to document another
enhanced momentum strategy based on identifying any
new fundamentals or combining them9 but to show that
market inefficiency/mispricing has many dimensions that
we can jointly exploit. After all, as Mclean and Pon-
tiff (2016, p. 8) argue ‘…mispricing accounting for some or
all of the original return predictability’; thus, treating mis-
pricing as an alternative to fundamentals would expand
our investment dimension and earn potential superior
returns. Nevertheless, we try to set an example by showing
that one can simultaneously use multiple dimensions of
market inefficiency to learn about (and profit from) future
stock returns. Our paper further shows that a combined
strategy generates hedging value to individual strategies
which provide double returns but no doubled standard
deviations across different market conditions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the data and the methodologies in for-
ming the portfolio strategies. Section 3 reports the empiri-
cal results and conducts the robustness test. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our sample consists of common stocks (share codes 10 and
11) traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) for the period from
January 1965 to December 2015. Monthly stock returns are
collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP), and accounting data used to construct investment
strategies is obtained from the Compustat.
We follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in con-
structing the price momentum strategy. Specifically, at the
end of each month (Month 0), we rank all stocks based on
their past 6-month returns (from Month −5 to Month 0)
and sort them into quintiles. We then take a long position
in the winner portfolio and a short position in the loser
portfolio and hold it for 6 months (from Month 2 to
Month 7). In line with the literature (Asness et al., 2013;
Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016; Fama & French, 1996), we
skip Month 1 to avoid short-term reversals due to micro-
structure issues, as suggested by Jegadeesh (1990), Leh-
mann (1990), and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004). Stocks
priced less than $5 at the beginning of the holding period
are excluded from the sample to prevent results from
being driven primarily by small and illiquid stocks
(Antoniou, Doukas, & Subrahmanyam, 2013; Cooper,
Gutierrez, & Hameed, 2004; Jegadeesh & Titman, 2001).
We follow Lyandres et al. (2008) in forming the invest-
ment strategy.10 Specifically, we measure the investment-
to-asset (I/A) ratio as the annual change in gross property,
plant, and equipment plus the annual change in invento-
ries divided by the lagged book value of assets. At the end
of each month, we rank all stocks based on their I/A ratios
reported in the most recent annual financial statement
and sort them into quintiles. We then take a long position
in the low investment portfolio and a short position in the
high investment portfolio and hold it for 6 months (from
Month 2 to Month 7).
To construct the InvMom strategy, we combine past
returns and I/A ratios. Specifically, at the end of each
month, we sort stocks independently into quintiles based
on their past 6-month returns and their latest I/A ratios,11
respectively. This independent double-sorting procedure
generates 5 × 5 combinations of momentum and invest-
ment portfolios. We form the InvMom strategy by taking a
long position in the winner portfolio with low investment
and a short position in the loser portfolio with high invest-
ment and hold them for the next 6 months (from Month
2 to Month 7). Throughout the paper, we test and compare
the performance between the InvMom strategy and the
individual strategy.
3 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first present the key empirical results
and test the persistence of the results. We next use the
equity financing and catering channels to show the inner
workings of the InvMom strategy in an attempt to gain a
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better understanding of the two-dimensional strategy.
We then show that our behavioural-based approach
indeed works better when mispricing is more severe,
such as in periods of high investor sentiment or for stocks
subject to high limits to arbitrage. Finally, we submit our
results to a battery of robustness tests, including using
different portfolio sorting and weighting methods,
adjusting for key firm characteristics, and applying alter-
native asset pricing models in our estimation.
3.1 | Momentum, investment, and
investment-momentum strategies
We first test the momentum and investment strategies
for our full sample (1965–2015) separately. Consistent
with the literature, Panel A of Table 1 shows that past
winners significantly outperform past losers by 0.75%
(t = 4.25) per month, and stocks with low capital invest-
ment outperform high-investment stocks by 0.61%
(t = 6.80) per month.12
Since both trading strategies are based on publicly
available information and both generate significant
abnormal returns, this indicates market inefficiency/mis-
pricing in both dimensions. However, it is not clear
whether one strategy dominates or subsumes the other,
or whether both have reliable independent predictive
power. Thus, we examine the interaction effect between
these two dimensions.
Using the independent double-sorting method, we
construct 25 portfolios (5 × 5) based on past stock returns
and the latest I/A ratios. As seen in Panel B, the momen-
tum strategy generates a return of 0.70% (t = 3.41) per
month under low investment and 1.04% (t = 5.53) per
month under high investment. Nyberg and Pöyry (2014)
documented similar findings that the momentum effect is
strongest for the group of firms with the highest asset
growth. The investment strategy produces a return of
0.74% (t = 5.52) per month for loser stocks and 0.40%
(t = 3.34) per month for winner stocks. Hence, economi-
cally and statistically significant returns are generated by
following one strategy while the other is controlled for.
This suggests that neither the momentum nor the invest-
ment is capable of explaining or subsuming the other, and
each seems to carry unique information and should have
incremental power to enhance each other's performance.
Next, we combine the two distinct dimensions of mar-
ket inefficiencies to explore the potential joint effects and
enhanced performance. Specifically, we form our
InvMom strategy by longing past winners with low
investment and shorting past losers with high invest-
ment. Results in Panel C show that the InvMom strategy
generates a monthly return of 1.44% (t = 7.54), which
doubles the returns generated by either the momentum
(0.75% per month) or the investment strategy (0.61% per
month), and the differences in the returns are highly
significant with t-values above 5.
Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) propose t-value cutoffs
of 2.78 and 3.39 and argue that a newly discovered factor
should have a t-value above 3. Hou et al. (2020) show that
imposing a t-value cutoff of 2.78 increases the proportion
of insignificant anomalies to 82%. Our InvMom strategy
generates a monthly return of 1.44% with a t-value above
7, which is superior to either the momentum or invest-
ment strategy and demonstrates the power of the two-
dimensional strategy.
To better visualize the performance of the investment
momentum relative to the individual strategies, in
Figure 1, we plot the cumulative wealth of investing $1
in 1965 and holding it until 2015 by following five differ-
ent strategies: (a) investing in the risk-free asset,
(b) investing in the CRSP value-weighted index,
(c) investing in the momentum strategy of buying past
winners and selling past losers, (d) investing in the
investment strategy of buying low investment stocks and
shorting high investment stocks, and (e) investing in the
InvMom strategy of buying winner stocks with low
investment and shorting loser stocks with high invest-
ment. As seen, the InvMom strategy comfortably beats all
the other strategies right from the beginning, and the
compounding effect is rather extraordinary for the invest-
ment momentum, which leads to superior performance
for the past 50 years (1965–2015).
Since the markets have gone through many bull and
bear periods during our 50-year sample period, it would be
interesting to see how the InvMom strategy performs under
different market conditions. In the spirit of Novy-Marx
(2013), we assess the hedge value of the InvMom strategy
by measuring its performance against its standard devia-
tions and doing it also for the bull and bear markets, respec-
tively. In particular, we compare the annualized portfolio
returns and the Sharpe ratios of the combined strategy with
that of the individual strategy (i.e., momentum or invest-
ment) over the entire sample period and the sub-periods of
bull and bear markets. The bull and bear turning points are
determined by Bry and Boschan's (1971) dating method
based on the S&P 500 index.13
In Table 2, we show that the combined InvMom strat-
egy produces annualized returns twice as large as the
individual strategies without encountering a significant
increase of standard deviations for the whole sample
period. It also holds for the sub-samples of bull and bear
markets: the annualized returns (and the Sharpe ratios)
of the combined strategy is about twice as large, while
the standard deviations are only marginally larger. These
results demonstrate the persistence of the InvMom
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TABLE 1 Momentum, investment,
and investment-momentum strategies,
1965–2015
Panel A: Single sort on past returns or I/A ratios
Momentum portfolios Investment portfolios
(Past returns) (I/A ratios)
Loser 0.09% [0.28] Low 0.80% [2.99]
Winner 0.84% [3.26] High 0.19% [0.67]
Winner-loser 0.75% [4.25] Low-high 0.61% [6.80]
Panel B: Independent double sort by past returns and I/A ratios
I/A ratios
Past returns Low High Low-high
Loser 0.32% [0.89] −0.42% [−1.26] 0.74% [5.52]
Winner 1.02% [3.62] 0.62% [2.15] 0.40% [3.34]
Winner-loser 0.70% [3.41] 1.04% [5.53]
Panel C: Investment-momentum (InvMom)
InvMom 1.44% [7.54]
InvMom versus momentum 0.69% [7.15]
InvMom versus investment 0.83% [5.10]
Note: This table reports the average monthly returns of portfolios formed on past stock returns
or/and capital investment using common stocks traded on the NYSE/AMEX between 1965 and
2015. At the end of each month, stocks are ranked based on their past 6-month monthly stock
returns or their latest annual investment-to-asset (I/A) ratio and sorted into quintiles. Loser (Low)
consists of stocks with the lowest past 6-month returns (latest I/A ratios), while Winner (High)
consists of stocks with the highest past 6-month returns (latest I/A ratios). In Panel A, the average
monthly returns of loser and winner portfolios are reported, along with the raw profits of the
momentum portfolios (Winner–Loser) and the investment portfolios (Low–High). In Panel B,
stocks are sorted independently into quintiles based on past 6-month returns and their latest I/A
ratios. The intersections resulting from the two independent sorts generate 5 × 5 investment and
momentum portfolios. In Panel C, the investment-momentum (InvMom) strategy involves buying
past winner stocks with low investment and shorting loser stocks with high investment. Stocks
with prices below $5 are excluded from the sample. For all portfolios, the holding period is 6
months, and there is a 1-month gap between the end of the formation period and the beginning of
the holding period. Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are shown in brackets.
TABLE 2 Performance of the Investment-Momentum Strategy across Market Conditions
Full sample Bear markets Bull markets
Return SD Sharpe ratio Return SD Sharpe ratio Return SD
Sharpe
ratio
Momentum 9.38% 0.14 0.66 7.46% 0.13 0.55 15.67% 0.16 0.98
Investment 7.56% 0.07 1.05 5.94% 0.07 0.89 12.85% 0.09 1.50
InvMom 18.74% 0.16 1.21 16.15% 0.15 1.09 27.31% 0.18 1.55
Note: This table shows the annualized returns, annualized standard deviation (SD), and annualized Sharpe ratio of the momentum strategy
(buying past winners and shorting past losers), the investment strategy (buying low investment stocks and shorting high investment stocks),
and the investment-momentum strategy (buying winner stocks with low investment and shorting loser stocks with high investment) from
1965 to 2015. The annualized Sharpe ratio is estimated as the annualized monthly average excess returns divided by the annualized monthly
standard deviation. The bear market periods over our whole sample period include: February 1966–September 1966; December 1968–June
1970; January 1973–September 1974; January 1977–February 1978; December 1980–July 1982; July 1983–May 1984; September 1987–
November 1987; June 1990–October 1990; September 2000–February 2003; November 2007–February 2009, and the remaining periods are
classified as bull market periods.
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strategy despite different market conditions; especially, it
serves as a hedge against tough market conditions
(i.e., the bear markets).
3.2 | Persistence of the investment-
momentum strategy
Recent papers show that the momentum effect has grad-
ually disappeared over the last decade or so.14 Mclean
and Pontiff (2016) argue that the phenomenon of
diminishing anomalies has mainly been caused by the
increasing awareness of investors about mispricing from
academic publications, and they report that the average
predictor's abnormal returns shrink 58% post-publication.
How persistent is the InvMom strategy? In Table 3, we
conduct a sub-period analysis to test the persistence of
the InvMom strategy along with other individual
strategies.
Consistent with the literature, we observe a similar
pattern of diminishing returns under either the momen-
tum or investment strategy. The momentum strategy was
particularly strong both economically and statistically in
the first 25 years of the sample (1965–1989), whereas it
reduces to 0.55% per month (dropping by nearly half com-
pared to the first period) and becomes statistically insignif-
icant at the 5% level during the second 25-year period
(1990–2015). In comparison, although the InvMom strat-
egy also exhibits relatively weaker performance in the
second period, it generates 1.07% (t = 3.60) per month for
this period. During the most recent 15 years (2000–2015),
neither the momentum nor the investment strategy pro-
duces any statistically significant returns, whereas the
InvMom strategy still earns 0.76% per month, although it
is reduced to the 5% significance level.
Mclean and Pontiff (2016, p. 7) argue ‘If return pre-
dictability reflects mispricing and publication leads
sophisticated investors to learn about and trade against
the mispricing, then we expect the returns associated
with a predictor should disappear or at least decay after
the paper is published’. Since both the momentum and
investment anomalies have been well documented in the
literature, it should be no surprise that investors have
exploited these one-dimensional mispricing strategies.
Hence, turning to multiple dimensions of market ineffi-
ciency is necessary to obtain and maintain persistent per-
formance, which is what we advocate in this paper.
3.3 | Investment-momentum: Equity
financing and catering channels
Baker et al. (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009) show
that mispricing stocks affect firms' investment decisions
through either the equity financing channel or the cat-
ering channel. The equity financing channel has been
developed by a series of studies including, for example,
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Blanchard, Rhee,
TABLE 3 Persistence of the investment-momentum strategy
1965–1989 1990–2015
Momentum 0.95% [4.95] 0.55% [1.91]
Investment 0.83% [6.72] 0.40% [3.24]
InvMom 1.83% [8.15] 1.07% [3.60]
InvMom versus momentum 0.87% [7.47] 0.52% [3.50]
InvMom versus investment 1.00% [5.50] 0.67% [2.52]
1990–1999 2000–2015
Momentum 0.86% [2.58] 0.37% [0.88]
Investment 0.67% [4.09] 0.23% [1.38]
InvMom 1.57% [3.65] 0.76% [1.96]
InvMom versus momentum 0.71% [3.33] 0.40% [2.01]
InvMom versus investment 0.90% [2.44] 0.53% [1.47]
Note: This table reports the monthly returns of the investment-momentum strategy across different periods. The sample includes all common
stocks on the NYSE/AMEX with prices no less than $5 for the period 1965–2015. Stocks are divided into four sub-periods. Within each
period, the momentum strategy involves buying winner stocks and shorting loser stocks; the investment strategy involves buying low-
investment stocks and shorting high-investment stocks, and the investment momentum (InvMom) strategy involves buying winner stocks
with low investment and shorting loser stocks with high investment. For all strategies, the holding period is 6 months, and there is a
1-month gap between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period. Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are
reported in brackets.
6 XU ET AL.
and Summers (1993), and Stein (1996). Among these
studies, Stein (1996) is closely related to the work of
Baker et al. (2003). The model in Stein (1996) implies that
firms that need external equity to finance their marginal
investments are especially sensitive to the non-
fundamental component of stock prices (i.e., mispricing).
Specifically, in contrast to financially flexible firms that
can insulate their investment decisions from irrational
movements in stock prices, an equity-dependent firm is
less likely to proceed with its capital investment if it has
to issue undervalued shares. Baker et al. (2003) utilise a
simplified version of the model in Stein (1996) to derive
several testable hypotheses that are unique to the specific
equity financing channel. Their model prediction and
empirical tests indicate that stock prices have a more sub-
stantial impact on the investment of equity-dependent
firms (i.e., firms that need external equity to fund mar-
ginal investments).
To understand the impact of stock market mispricing
on firms' investment policy, Polk and Sapienza (2009)
consider an alternative channel—the catering theory.15
They argue that managers may try to misallocate invest-
ment capital to boost short-run share prices if stock mar-
kets misprice firms according to their investment levels.
For example, firms may invest in value-destroying pro-
jects (forgo positive investment opportunities) when their
stock is overvalued (undervalued).
We conjecture that the incremental value of corpo-
rate investment to a momentum trader should be more
pronounced when the conditions are more favourable
for the two channels to function. Both the equity
financing channel and the catering channel suggests
that firms are more likely to overinvest when its stock
price is overvalued, either to take advantage of issuing
overpriced shares or to cater the current market senti-
ment. Hence, the level of corporate investment serves
as a good indicator of the degree of mispricing and,
therefore, lends more incremental information to the
momentum traders.
The equity financing channel works better for equity-
dependent firms, which tend to be young firms with
strong investment opportunities, but with low cash bal-
ances and high cash-flow volatility (Baker et al., 2003).
The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of financial con-
straints satisfies most of these criteria and, therefore, is
employed in Baker et al. (2003) to measure firms' equity
dependence.16 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify firms
into discrete categories of financial constraints using both
subjective and objective criteria and then relate their
qualitative ranking to five accounting ratios using an
ordered logit regression. The regression parameters allow
one to create a synthetic KZ index of financial constraints
(Baker et al., 2003; Lamont, Polk, & Saaá-Requejo, 2001).
Following these studies, we construct the five-variable











where CFit/Ait − 1 is cash flow over lagged total assets;
DIVit/Ait − 1 is cash dividends over lagged assets; Cit/Ait
− 1 is cash balances over lagged assets; LEVit is leverage;
and Q is the market value of equity plus assets minus the
book value of equity scaled by lagged assets.
The catering channel works better for more opaque
firms, which is measured by the research and develop-
ment (R&D) intensity of the firm (Polk &
Sapienza, 2009). Firms with higher (lower) R&D intensity
is considered to be more opaque (transparent), based on
the assumption that it is more difficult and time-
consuming to resolute all valuation uncertainty for R&D
projects than for other types of projects. R&D intensity is
measured as total R&D expenses over lagged total assets.
We test whether the InvMom strategy is more pro-
nounced when the conditions are more favourable for
the two channels to function (i.e., when corporate invest-
ment carries more incremental information of
mispricing).
In Panel A of Table 4, we first sort and equally
divided stocks into high, medium, and low groups based
on the KZ index. We then test all three strategies within
each group. The InvMom strategy generates a significant
return of 1.75% (t = 4.75) per month for more equity-
dependent firms compared to 0.95% (t = 3.47) per month
for less equity-dependent firms. Similarly, in Panel B, we
first sort and equally divided stocks into high, medium,
and low groups based on the R&D intensity. We then
perform the three strategies. As expected, the InvMom
strategy generates a return of 1.62% (t = 4.83) per month
for more opaque firms compared to 1.06 (t = 3.10) per
month for less opaque firms. Overall, these results are
consistent with our conjecture and helped us gain a bet-
ter understanding of why and how the InvMom strategy
generates superior performance.
3.4 | Investor sentiment and limits to
arbitrage
Our analysis, so far, shows that the two-dimensional
strategy outperforms the individual strategy. Since our
InvMom strategy is based on multiple dimensions of mar-
ket inefficiency, it should generate better performance
when mispricing is more acute, such as in periods of high
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investor sentiment or for stocks subject to more severe
limits to arbitrage.
3.4.1 | Investor sentiment and
investment momentum
Prior studies have shown that investor sentiment plays a
significant role in explaining asset pricing anomalies
(Baker & Wurgler, 2006; Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan,
2012; Lemmon & Portniaguina, 2006; Hribar &
McInnis, 2012; Seybert & Yang, 2012; Stambaugh, Yu, &
Yuan, 2012, 2014; Firth, Wang, & Wong, 2014). Gener-
ally, during high-sentiment periods, the optimistic views
tend to be overly optimistic, and stocks are likely to be
overpriced. During low-sentiment periods, the optimistic
views tend to be more realistic, and stocks are likely to be
more correctly priced. Consequently, anomalies should
be more pronounced during high-sentiment periods.
We conjecture that the investment-momentum anom-
aly should be more pronounced in periods of high investor
sentiment. In Table 5, we sort and equally divided stocks
into high, medium, and low sentiment periods based on
the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index (Panel A)
and the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index
(Panel B).17 Our results show that the InvMom strategy is
both economically and statistically stronger in high-
sentiment periods than in low-sentiment periods. For
instance, using the University of Michigan sentiment mea-
sure (Panel B), the InvMom strategy generates a monthly
return of 1.80% (t = 7.47) in high-sentiment periods com-
pared to 0.99% (t = 3.10) in low-sentiment periods.
Overall, the results in Table 5 are consistent with our
conjecture that the investment-momentum anomaly is
more pronounced in periods of high investor sentiment,
in which the mispricing is more severe.
3.4.2 | Limits to arbitrage and
investment momentum
We next examine how the InvMom strategy performs
under different levels of limits to arbitrage. Prior studies
show that limits to arbitrage can prevent the effectiveness
TABLE 4 Investment-momentum:
The ‘equity financing’ and ‘catering’
channels
Panel A: The ‘equity financing’ channel: Equity dependent/financial constraints
High Medium Low
Momentum 0.98% [3.85] 0.62% [3.11] 0.47% [2.78]
Investment 0.53% [2.49] 0.72% [5.13] 0.50% [3.45]
InvMom 1.75% [4.75] 1.20% [4.00] 0.95% [3.47]
InvMom versus momentum 0.77% [2.48] 0.59% [2.77] 0.48% [2.06]
InvMom versus investment 1.22% [3.84] 0.48% [1.94] 0.45% [2.07]
Panel B: The ‘catering’ channel: R&D intensity
High Medium Low
Momentum 0.71% [3.18] 0.64% [3.22] 0.56% [2.64]
Investment 0.69% [3.52] 0.77% [5.38] 0.53% [2.69]
InvMom 1.62% [4.83] 1.60% [5.99] 1.06% [3.10]
InvMom versus momentum 0.91% [3.39] 0.95% [4.26] 0.50% [1.94]
InvMom versus investment 0.93% [3.08] 0.83% [3.58] 0.53% [1.71]
Note: This table tests the investment-momentum strategy via the ‘equity financing’ and ‘catering’
channels. Equity dependent/financial constraints are measured by the KZ index of Kaplan and
Zingales (1997). R&D intensity is measured as firms' annual R&D expenses scaled by the lagged
book value of assets. The sample includes all common stocks on the NYSE/AMEX with prices no
less than $5 for the period 1965–2015. All stocks are equally divided (i.e., 1/3) into high, medium,
and low groups based on the KZ index or R&D intensity. Within each group, the momentum
strategy involves buying winner stocks and shorting loser stocks; the investment strategy involves
buying low-investment stocks and shorting high-investment stocks; and the investment-
momentum (InvMom) strategy involves buying winner stocks with low investment and shorting
loser stocks with high investment. For all strategies, the holding period is 6 months, and there is a
1-month gap between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period.
Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets.
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of rational arbitrageurs to ‘undo the dislocations’ caused
by irrational investors (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Brav &
Heaton, 2002; Brav, Heaton, & Li, 2009; Doukas, Kim, &
Pantzalis, 2010; Hirshleifer, 2001; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). Given arbitrage is risky, costly, and limited,
the investment-momentum anomaly should be more pro-
nounced for stocks subject to high limits to arbitrage. To
test this, we use three alternative measures for limits to
arbitrage: the bid-ask spread, institutional ownership, and
idiosyncratic volatility. Table 6 presents the results.
First, the bid-ask spread is estimated as the difference
between the quoted ask and bid prices from the mid-quote
on a particular day (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). It repre-
sents compensation to the market maker or dealer for a
round-trip transaction (purchase and sale). Stocks with
high bid-ask spread are subject to higher limits to arbi-
trage than stocks with a low bid-ask spread. Panel A
shows that all three strategies perform better in groups
with a high bid-ask spread. The InvMom strategy gener-
ates a return of 2.13% per month under high bid-ask
spread compared to 0.72% per month under low spread. It
also clearly beats both the momentum and investment
strategies no matter the level of the bid-ask spread.
Second, institutional ownership is related to the
supply of stocks in the equity loan market (Dechow,
Hutton, Meulbroek, & Sloan, 2001). Low institutional
ownership implies a limited availability of stocks for
borrowing and, thus, high short-selling costs. Follow-
ing Nagel (2005), we use the percentage of institutional
ownership (IO) divided by the number of shares out-
standing to capture the costs of short selling. Panel B
shows similar results. The InvMom strategy beats other
strategies in all situations and generates a significant
1.67% per month under high institutional ownership
compared to 0.96% per month under low institutional
ownership.
Finally, idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of hold-
ing costs also captures the costs of arbitrage
(Pontiff, 2006). Following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang (2006) and Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang (2009),
we measure idiosyncratic volatility as the standard devia-
tion of the residuals from the regressions of stock returns
over the prior 12 months based on the Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model. Panel C, again, shows
consistent results. The InvMom strategy beats other strat-
egies and generates a significant 2.07% per month under
TABLE 5 Investor sentiment and
investment-momentum
Panel A: Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index
High Medium Low
Momentum 0.79% [4.20] 0.77% [2.65] 0.53% [1.34]
Investment 0.64% [4.27] 0.40% [2.82] 0.52% [3.52]
InvMom 1.47% [6.11] 1.32% [4.25] 1.25% [3.18]
InvMom versus momentum 0.67% [4.32] 0.55% [3.53] 0.72% [4.42]
InvMom versus investment 0.83% [4.26] 0.91% [3.40] 0.73% [2.14]
Panel B: University of Michigan Consumer sentiment index
High Medium Low
Momentum 1.18% [6.41] 0.82% [5.06] 0.28% [0.87]
Investment 0.51% [4.79] 0.50% [4.51] 0.65% [4.44]
InvMom 1.80% [7.47] 1.32% [6.52] 0.99% [3.10]
InvMom versus momentum 0.62% [4.47] 0.51% [3.68] 0.71% [4.79]
InvMom versus investment 1.29% [6.62] 0.82% [4.79] 0.34% [1.26]
Note: This table tests the investment-momentum strategy across different levels of investor sen-
timent. Investor sentiment is measured by Baker and Wurgler's (2006) investor sentiment index
and the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index, respectively. The sample includes
all common stocks on the NYSE/AMEX with prices no less than $5 for the period 1965–2015.
All stocks are equally divided (i.e., 1/3) into high, medium, and low groups based on investor
sentiment. Within each group, the momentum strategy involves buying winner stocks and
shorting loser stocks; the investment strategy involves buying low-investment stocks and short-
ing high-investment stocks; and the investment-momentum (InvMom) strategy involves buying
winner stocks with low investment and shorting loser stocks with high investment. For all strat-
egies, the holding period is 6 months, and there is a 1-month gap between the end of the forma-
tion period and the beginning of the holding period. Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are
reported in brackets.
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high idiosyncratic volatility compared to 0.60% per
month under low idiosyncratic volatility.
Overall, Table 6 presents consistent results that the
InvMom strategy performs better for stocks subject to
high limits to arbitrage, and the two-dimensional strategy
outperforms the investment and momentum strategies
regardless of the level of limits to arbitrage.
3.5 | Robustness tests
In this subsection, we present a series of robustness tests
on our results. We test our results across different size
groups. We try alternative portfolio sorting and
weighting methods in our estimations. We control for
key firm characteristics, such as size, book-to-market,
and industry, in measuring performance. In addition,
we adjust for risk using different asset pricing models.
In general, our results stand firm in these alternative
tests.
3.5.1 | The performance of investment-
momentum across different size groups
Our investment-momentum strategy may potentially be
affected by the size effect. To investigate this, we run sub-
sample tests by splitting firms into five size groups based
on the NYSE size breakpoints. We re-estimate the profit-
ability of the individual strategy (momentum or invest-
ment) and the combined InvMom strategy within each
size group.
TABLE 6 Limits-to-arbitrage and
investment-momentum
Panel A: Limits-to-arbitrage measured by bid-ask spread
High Medium Low
Momentum 1.15% [4.78] 0.55% [3.67] 0.37% [3.64]
Investment 0.85% [5.74] 0.48% [5.07] 0.39% [5.74]
InvMom 2.13% [7.58] 1.19% [6.87] 0.72% [5.24]
InvMom versus momentum 0.98% [5.17] 0.64% [5.42] 0.34% [3.90]
InvMom versus investment 1.28% [5.32] 0.71% [4.77] 0.33% [2.78]
Panel B: Limits-to-arbitrage measured by institutional ownership
High Medium Low
Momentum 1.15% [4.78] 0.55% [3.67] 0.37% [3.64]
Investment 0.85% [5.74] 0.48% [5.07] 0.39% [5.74]
InvMom 2.13% [7.58] 1.19% [6.87] 0.72% [5.24]
InvMom versus momentum 0.98% [5.17] 0.64% [5.42] 0.34% [3.90]
InvMom versus investment 1.28% [5.32] 0.71% [4.77] 0.33% [2.78]
Panel C: Limits-to-arbitrage measured by idiosyncratic volatility
High Medium Low
Momentum 1.09% [4.53] 0.61% [4.20] 0.28% [2.58]
Investment 1.00% [6.96] 0.54% [5.19] 0.31% [4.65]
InvMom 2.07% [7.15] 1.29% [7.35] 0.60% [5.11]
InvMom versus momentum 0.98% [4.97] 0.68% [5.80] 0.32% [4.03]
InvMom versus investment 1.07% [4.34] 0.75% [4.96] 0.29% [2.61]
Note: This table tests the investment-momentum strategy under different levels of limits-to-arbi-
trage. The limits-to-arbitrage are measure by three proxies: bid-ask spread, institutional owner-
ship, and idiosyncratic risk. The sample includes all common stocks on the NYSE/AMEX with
prices no less than $5 for the period 1965–2015. All stocks are equally divided (i.e., 1/3) into
high, medium, and low groups based on limits-to-arbitrage. Within each group, the momentum
strategy involves buying winner stocks and shorting loser stocks; the investment strategy
involves buying low-investment stocks and shorting high-investment stocks, and the
investment-momentum (InvMom) strategy involves buying winner stocks with low investment
and shorting loser stocks with high investment. For all strategies, the holding period is 6
months, and there is a 1-month gap between the end of the formation period and the beginning
of the holding period. Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets.
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In Table 7, we show that the InvMom strategy gener-
ates significant positive monthly returns across all size
groups. It outperforms twice as large as the individual
strategy throughout the different size groups. This sug-
gests that our enhanced investment-momentum strategy
is implementable to a wide range of size groups and is
not driven by the size effect.
3.5.2 | Robustness on alternative
portfolio sorting and weighting methods
In Table 8, we present various robustness checks based on
alternative estimation and portfolio sorting methods. First,
we calculate the value-weighted raw returns. The InvMom
strategy generates a value-weighted return of 1.09%
(t = 4.57) per month, which beats the individual strategies
by more than two times. Second, we change our portfolio
formation method and form 10 momentum portfolios and
3 investment portfolios (10 × 3), instead of five momen-
tum and five investment portfolios (5 × 5). Again, the
InvMom strategy produces a return of 1.49% (t = 6.14) per
month, which beats the other two strategies.
Third, we use alternative portfolio formation and
holding periods. Instead of using the typical 6-month for-
mation and 6-month holding period, we form portfolios
based on a 12-month formation and 12-month holding
period. The InvMom strategy generates a relatively lower
return of 0.85% (t = 4.53) per month under the 12-month
method compared to the 6-month method, although it
still clearly outperforms the other individual strategies.
Finally, instead of using independent double sorting
based on past 6-month stock returns and the latest I/A
ratio, we test our results using sequential double sorting,
where we first sort all stocks into quintiles based on their
past 6-month returns, and then for each group, we
further sort stocks into five portfolios based on their latest
I/A ratios. The InvMom strategy generates a monthly
return of 1.62% (t = 7.71) under the sequential double-
sorting method. Thus, our results are not sensitive to dif-
ferent double-sorting methods.
3.5.3 | Robustness on characteristic-
adjusted returns
In Table 9, we show the tested strategies by adjusting for
the key firm characteristics, namely size, book-to-market,
and industry. The size adjustment is based on size decile
portfolios. We take the market value of equity as firm size,
which is calculated as the closing price per share multiplied
by the number of outstanding shares. The book-to-market
adjustment is based on book-to-market decile portfolios.
The book-to-market ratio is calculated using the book value
of equity over the market value of equity at the end of the
formation period.18 The size and book-to-market adjust-
ment are based on a 5 × 5 size and book-to-market portfo-
lios. Stocks are matched to the appropriate size, book-to-
market, or size and book-to-market portfolios.19 The size-
adjusted, book-to-market-adjusted, and size- and book-to-
market-adjusted returns are calculated using the monthly
return of the individual stock minus the monthly return of
the appropriate benchmark portfolio.
We also adjust stock returns for their industry varia-
tions, as argued by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), Pan,
Liano, and Huang (2004), and Szakmary and Zhou (2015),
who state that the momentum effect could be generated
from the persistence of industry portfolio returns. Indus-
try adjustment is based on the Fama and French
12-industry portfolios. The four-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes provided by the CRSP are used
for industry classification.20 Stocks are matched to the
TABLE 7 Investment-momentum across different size groups
ME1 ME2 ME3 ME4 ME5
Momentum 0.97% [3.89] 0.69% [3.54] 0.59% [3.26] 0.41% [2.41] 0.32% [2.13]
Investment 0.68% [6.20] 0.65% [5.34] 0.59% [4.90] 0.36% [3.19] 0.32% [2.77]
InvMom 1.91% [7.62] 1.28% [5.26] 1.34% [5.88] 0.94% [4.27] 0.72% [3.91]
InvMom versus momentum 0.94% [4.89] 0.60% [3.98] 0.76% [4.66] 0.53% [3.70] 0.39% [3.34]
InvMom versus investment 1.23% [5.58] 0.63% [3.17] 0.75% [3.77] 0.58% [2.91] 0.40% [2.21]
Note: This table tests the investment-momentum strategy across different size groups. The sample includes all common stocks on the NYSE/
AMEX with prices no less than $5 for the period 1965–2015. All stocks are matched into appropriate size quintiles based on the NYSE 20%-
size breakpoints. ME5 (ME1) represents the group with the largest (smallest) firms, where the firm size is measured by the market capitaliza-
tion of stocks at the end of the formation period. Within each group, the momentum strategy involves buying winner stocks and shorting
loser stocks; the investment strategy involves buying low-investment stocks and shorting high-investment stocks; and the investment-
momentum (InvMom) strategy involves buying winner stocks with low investment and shorting loser stocks with high investment. For all
strategies, the holding period is 6 months, and there is a 1-month gap between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the hold-
ing period. Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets.
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appropriate industry portfolio, and the industry-adjusted
returns are calculated using the monthly return of the
individual stock minus the monthly return of the appro-
priate industry portfolio.
Table 9 reports the characteristic-adjusted returns. As
seen, the results are highly consistent across different
adjustments. The InvMom strategy generates around
1.35% per month (compared to 1.44% per month using
TABLE 8 Robustness on portfolio sorting and weighting
Value-weighted
raw returns
Ten price momentum and
three I/A portfolios
Twelve months formation period
and 12 months holding period
Sequential double
sorting
Momentum 0.45% [2.27] 1.07% [4.50] 0.35% [1.94] 0.75% [4.25]
Investment 0.40% [3.34] 0.44% [6.18] 0.50% [5.79] 0.61% [6.80]
InvMom 1.09% [4.57] 1.49% [6.14] 0.85% [4.53] 1.62% [7.71]
InvMom versus momentum 0.64% [4.49] 0.42% [4.29] 0.51% [4.93] 0.87% [7.98]
InvMom versus investment 0.69% [3.12] 1.05% [4.06] 0.35% [2.04] 1.01% [5.63]
Note: This table conducts robustness checks on the momentum, investment, and investment-momentum strategies based on different portfolio
sorting and weighting methods. The sample includes all common stocks on the NYSE/AMEX with prices no less than $5 for the period
1965–2015. At the end of each month, stocks are ranked based on their past 6-month monthly stock returns or their latest annual investment-
to-asset (I/A) ratio and sorted into quintiles. The intersections resulting from the two independent sorts generate 5 × 5 investment and momen-
tum portfolios. The momentum strategy involves buying winner stocks and shorting loser stocks; the investment strategy involves buying low-
investment stocks and shorting high-investment stocks, and the investment-momentum (InvMom) strategy involves buying winner stocks with
low investment and shorting loser stocks with high investment. For all strategies (except the 12-month holding period), the holding period is 6
months, and there is a 1-month gap between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period. Columns 1 and 2 show
the holding period returns based on the value-weighted average monthly raw returns. Columns 3 and 4 show average returns of intersecting
portfolios of 10 price momentum and three investment-to-asset (I/A) ratios portfolios. Columns 5 and 6 shows average returns over 12-month
holding periods (from Month 2 to 13) of portfolios formed based on 12-month formation periods (Month −11 to 0). Columns 7 and 8 show
results use the sequential double sorting, where stocks are first sorted into quintiles based on their past 6-month returns and then further sorted
into five equal groups based on their latest I/A ratios within each quintile. Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets.
TABLE 9 Robustness on characteristic-adjusted returns
Book-to-market Size and book-to-market
Size-adjusted
returns Adjusted returns Adjusted returns
Industry-adjusted
returns
Momentum 0.72% [4.26] 0.82% [4.94] 0.80% [4.91] 0.69% [4.34]
Investment 0.56% [6.53] 0.50% [5.90] 0.43% [5.67] 0.58% [7.36]
InvMom 1.38% [7.60] 1.40% [7.52] 1.34% [7.48] 1.33% [7.57]
InvMom versus momentum 0.66% [7.20] 0.58% [6.38] 0.53% [5.98] 0.64% [7.48]
InvMom versus investment 0.82% [5.20] 0.89% [5.70] 0.91% [5.88] 0.75% [5.17]
Note: This table tests the robustness of the momentum, investment, and investment-momentum strategies on characteristic-adjusted returns.
The sample includes all common stocks on the NYSE/AMEX with prices no less than $5 for the period 1965–2015. At the end of each month,
stocks are ranked based on their past 6-month monthly stock returns or their latest annual investment-to-asset (I/A) ratio and sorted into quin-
tiles. The intersections resulting from the two independent sorts generate 5 × 5 investment and momentum portfolios. The momentum strategy
involves buying winner stocks and shorting loser stocks; the investment strategy involves buying low-investment stocks and shorting high-
investment stocks, and the investment-momentum (InvMom) strategy involves buying winner stocks with low investment and shorting loser
stocks with high investment. For all strategies, the holding period is 6 months, and there is a 1-month gap between the end of the formation
period and the beginning of the holding period. Columns 1 and 2 use size-adjusted returns based on size decile portfolios. Firm size is measured
as the market value of equity which equals closing share prices multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Columns 3 and 4 use the book-
to-market adjusted returns based on book-to-market decile portfolios. The book-to-market ratio is calculated using the book value of equity
divided by the market value of equity at the end of the formation period. Columns 5 and 6 use size and book-to-market adjusted returns, which
is based on 5 × 5 size and book-to-market portfolios. Columns 7 and 8 use the industry-adjusted returns, which is based on 12-industry portfo-
lios defined using four-digit SIC codes from CRSP. The definition of 12-industry classification is obtained from Kenneth French's website. Stocks
are matched with the appropriate industry portfolio, and the industry-adjusted returns are calculated using the monthly returns of the individ-
ual stock minus the monthly returns of the appropriate industry portfolio. Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in brackets.
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the raw return) across the board, which is about twice as
much as the returns earned by individual strategies.
Overall, the characteristic adjustment does not affect our
overall results.
3.5.4 | Robustness on risk-adjusted asset
pricing models
We estimate the abnormal returns (alphas) for each trad-
ing strategy using four common asset pricing models to
adjust for risk: the CAPM by Sharpe (1964), the Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model, the Fama and
French (2016) five-factor model, and the Pástor and Stam-
baugh (2003) liquidity-extended Fama–French three-factor
model.21 The asset pricing models used are listed below:
Ri,t − Rf,t = αi,t + βi,mkt fMKT,t + εi,t,
Ri,t − Rf,t = αi,t + βi,mkt fMKT,t + βi,s fSMB,t + βi,h
fHML,t + εi,t,
Ri,t − Rf,t = αi,t + βi,mkt fMKT,t + βi,s fSMB,t + βi,h
fHML,t + βi,r fRMW,t + βi,c fCMA,t + εi,t,
Ri,t − Rf,t = αi,t + βi,mkt fMKT,t + βi,sfSMB,t + βi,h
fHML,t + βi,p fPSF,t + εi,t,
where Ri,t is the month—t return of portfolio i, Rf,t is the
risk-free rate for month t, fMKT,t is the month-t value of
the market factor, fSMB,t is the month-t value of the
Fama–French size factor, fHML,t is the month-t value of
the Fama–French book-to-market factor, fRMW,t is the
month-t value of the Fama–French profitability factor,
fCMA,t is the month-t value of the Fama–French invest-
ment factor, and fPSF,t is the month-t value of the Pástor–
Stambaugh traded liquidity factor.22
Table 10 reports the estimated alphas (using monthly
returns) for each trading strategy under the four different
asset pricing models. The results are highly consistent
across different benchmark models. For instance, under
the Fama–French five-factor model, the InvMom strategy
generates an alpha of 1.38% (t = 6.26) per month com-
pared to 0.80% (t = 4.01) per month under the momen-
tum strategy and 0.48% (t = 5.70) per month under the
investment strategy. Overall, Table 10 presents consistent
evidence that the InvMom strategy outperforms the
investment and momentum strategy under all commonly
used asset pricing models.
To test the overlapping part of the momentum/invest-
ment effects, we further conduct a spanning test follow-
ing Novy-Marx (2015) and report the estimated alpha
following Carhart's (1997) four-factor model and the I/A
factor-extended Fama–French three-factor model.23 We
find that the investment effect cannot be fully captured
by the momentum effect, where the estimated alpha of
the investment strategy following Carhart's (1997) four-
factor model remains significantly positive. We also find
that the investment effect cannot entirely dominate the
momentum effect because the estimated alpha of the
TABLE 10 Robustness on risk-adjusted asset pricing models
Fama–French Fama–French Pástor–Stambaugh
CAPM Three-factor model Five-factor model Liq. FF three-factor model
Momentum 0.82% [5.17] 0.96% [6.41] 0.80% [4.01] 1.17% [7.16]
Investment 0.65% [7.01] 0.52% [5.79] 0.48% [5.70] 0.53% [5.04]
InvMom 1.53% [8.46] 1.53% [8.22] 1.38% [6.26] 1.77% [8.59]
InvMom versus momentum 0.72% [7.20] 0.57% [5.81] 0.59% [6.05] 0.59% [5.15]
InvMom versus investment 0.88% [5.84] 1.01% [6.66] 0.90% [4.82] 1.24% [7.25]
Note: This table tests the robustness of the momentum, investment, and investment-momentum strategies under commonly used asset pric-
ing models. The sample includes all common stocks on the NYSE/AMEX with prices no less than $5 for the period 1965–2015. The table
reports estimated regression alphas of monthly returns for the momentum, investment, and investment-momentum strategies under the fol-
lowing asset pricing models: the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the Fama–French three- and five-factor model, the Pástor and Stam-
baugh (2003) liquidity-extended Fama–French three-factor model, the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model, and the I/A ratio extended Fama–
French three-factor model. The sample includes all common stocks on the NYSE/AMEX with prices no less than $5 for the period
1965–2015. At the end of each month, stocks are ranked based on their past 6-month monthly stock returns or their latest annual
investment-to-asset (I/A) ratio and sorted into quintiles. The intersections resulting from the two independent sorts generate 5 × 5 invest-
ment and momentum portfolios. The momentum strategy involves buying winner stocks and shorting loser stocks; the investment strategy
involves buying low-investment stocks and shorting high-investment stocks, and the investment-momentum (InvMom) strategy involves
buying winner stocks with low investment and shorting loser stocks with high investment. For all strategies, the holding period is 6 months,
and there is a 1-month gap between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period. Newey–West (1987) adjusted t-
statistics are reported in brackets.
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momentum strategy remains significantly positive follow-
ing the Fama–French three-factor model with further
control of the investment factor.
4 | CONCLUSION
Following the initial publication of the price-momentum
strategy (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993), a string of studies
set out to discover enhanced or strengthened momentum
strategies by identifying and combining firms' fundamen-
tals with past stock returns to generate superior perfor-
mance. This approach has indeed achieved considerable
success. It is not difficult to understand why the focus
has long been on fundamentals, as Huang et al. (2019)
argue that ‘academic research and education are almost
entirely fundamentals’.
Instead of following this lead and documenting
another fundamental-enhanced momentum strategy, in
this paper, we investigate the non-fundamental compo-
nent of stock prices (i.e., mispricing) and propose the
InvMom strategy by simultaneously exploiting two
dimensions of market inefficiency: the ‘under-reaction
left behind by the newswatchers’ and the mispricing indi-
cated by a firm's capital investment. Our choice of these
two dimensions is supported by the fact that the invest-
ment and momentum anomalies are the two strongest
anomalies of all (Hou et al., 2020). We conjecture that, if
these two dimensions carry an independent and incre-
mental information set of market inefficiencies, they
should be able to reinforce each other and generate supe-
rior performance.
Empirically, we show that the InvMom strategy of buy-
ing past winners with low investment and short-selling
past losers with high investment generates twice the
monthly returns earned by either the price momentum or
investment strategy (1.44% vs 0.75% or 0.61%) from 1965 to
2015. We find that, despite the diminishing/disappearing
anomalies in recent decades (Mclean & Pontiff, 2016), the
InvMom strategy stays persistent. We use the equity
financing and catering channels to show the inner work-
ings of the InvMom strategy. We find that the strategy
works better when the conditions are more favourable for
the two channels to function (i.e., when investment serves
as a better indicator of mispricing and, hence, adds more
incremental information to the price momentum). Given
our approach is to take advantage of multiple dimensions
of market inefficiency, it should perform better when mis-
pricing is more acute. Indeed, we find that the investment-
momentum anomaly is more pronounced in periods of
high investor sentiment or for stocks subject to severe
limits to arbitrage, which is consistent with our expecta-
tions. Overall, our study suggests that, in addition to
identifying fundamental-enhanced momentum strategies,
one can simultaneously use multiple dimensions of mar-
ket inefficiency to arbitrage away over and above ‘any
under-reaction left behind by the newswatchers’.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful for the helpful comments from George
Bulkley, George Wang, and Yaqiong Yao.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new





1 Fama and French (2008, 2016) confirm that the price momentum
phenomenon remains one of the most persistent anomalies.
2 Polk and Sapienza (2009, p. 187) state ‘If the market misprices
firms according to their level of investment, managers may try to
boost short-run share prices by catering to current sentiment’.
3 Under Hong and Stein's (1999) framework, newswatchers forecast
future stock prices based on their private information but do not
learn information from others via stock prices. Therefore, infor-
mation diffuses slowly, which generates momentum profits for
momentum traders who trade solely based on past stock prices,
and the stock prices will correct the initial underreaction and
accelerate in the short term.
4 The investment strategy is to take a long position in the low-investment
stocks and a short position in the high-investment stocks to generate
positive abnormal returns (Cooper, Gulen, & Schill, 2008; Hou, Xue, &
Zhang, 2020; Lam & Wei, 2011; Lyandres, Sun, & Zhang, 2008;
Watanabe, Xu, Yao, & Yu, 2013). Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and
Cooper et al. (2008) argue that the investment anomaly is because
investors are too slow to incorporate the information implied in corpo-
rate investment into stock prices, thereby causing mispricing.
5 Returns generated by the price-momentum strategy declined sig-
nificantly in the past decade or so. For example, see the work by
Hwang and Rubesam (2015) and Mclean and Pontiff (2016).
6 In conditions in which the equity financing and catering channels
work better, a firm's level of investment serves as a better indica-
tor of mispricing.
7 Kusnadi and Wei (2017) confirm the existence of both channels
with international data.
8 For example, rational models suggest that the profitability of
momentum strategies may reflect risk compensation (Conrad &
Kaul, 1998; Jiang & Zhang, 2013).
9 It is not difficult to understand why the focus has long been on
fundamentals, as Huang et al. (2019) argue that ‘academic
research and education are almost entirely fundamentals’.
10 The other commonly used investment strategy is based on Coo-
per et al.'s (2008) investment-to-asset ratios. Hou et al. (2020)
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show that the two investment measures generate similar results
during 1967–2016.
11 The independent double-sorting method provides better controls
in our study because the trailing 6-month returns are similar
within the investment quintiles, and the I/A ratios are similar
within the momentum quintiles (numbers are untabulated). In
robustness tests, we also use sequential double-sorting, and we
find similar results.
12 In a latest study, Hou et al. (2020) replicates the Jegadeesh and
Titman's (1993) momentum strategy and Lyandres et al.'s (2008)
investment strategy for the period of 1967–2016. Our results are
similar to their findings.
13 We obtained the bear and bull turning points from Nyberg (2013),
where the bear market starts between the month following the
peak point and ends by the trough points, and vice versa for the
bull market. The bear market periods over our whole sample
period include: February 1966–September 1966; December 1968–
June 1970; January 1973–September 1974; January 1977–February
1978; December 1980–July 1982; July 1983–May 1984; September
1987–November 1987; June 1990–October 1990; September 2000–
February 2003; November 2007–February 2009, and the remaining
periods are classified as the bull market periods.
14 ‘After the dismal performance of momentum in the last 10 years,
some could argue it is a dead anomaly’ (Barroso & Santa-Clara,-
2015, p. 112).
15 Polk and Sapienza's (2009) model is also built on the intuition of
Stein's (1996) short-horizons model. Different from Baker
et al. (2003), Polk and Sapienza (2009) focus on the catering the-
ory and assume that all firms are financially unconstrained.
16 Baker et al. (2003) explain that using the established KZ index,
as opposed to building an equity dependence measure from
scratch, also minimizes any concerns about data mining.
17 Baker and Wurgler's sentiment index is obtained from Jeffrey
Wurgler's NYU webpage: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/.
The University of Michigan sentiment index is downloaded from
the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers website:
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/.
18 We use the book value of equity from the prior fiscal year end
and skip 6 months before calculating returns to allow for the
delay of financial statement releases.
19 The construction of breakpoints of the size decile portfolios, book-
to-market decile portfolios, and 5 × 5 size and book-to-market
portfolios are based on Fama and French's (1992) method, which
is obtained from Kenneth French's online data library: http://mba.
tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
20 The definition of the 12-industry classification is obtained from
Kenneth French's online data library.
21 Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) argue that the liquidity risk factor
accounts for half of the payoffs to a momentum strategy.
22 We collect monthly returns of most of these risk factors from
Kenneth French's website. We obtain the monthly returns of the
liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) from the Whar-
ton Research Data Services (WRDS).
23 The monthly returns of the momentum factor are collected from
Kenneth French's website, and the monthly returns of the I/A
factor are provided by Lu Zhang.
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